Individual differences in children’s corepresentation of self and other in joint action by Milward, Sophie J. et al.
  
 
 
 
  warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Milward, Sophie J., Kita, Sotaro and Apperly, Ian A.. (2016) Individual differences in 
children’s corepresentation of self and other in joint action. Child Development. 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/76184           
       
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work of researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. 
 
This article is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
license (CC BY 4.0) and may be reused according to the conditions of the license.  For more 
details see: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/   
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented in WRAP is the published version, or, version of record, and may be 
cited as it appears here. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Individual Differences in Children’s Corepresentation of Self and Other in
Joint Action
Sophie J. Milward
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology and
University of Birmingham
Sotaro Kita
University of Warwick
Ian A. Apperly
University of Birmingham
Previous research has shown that children aged 4–5 years, but not 2–3 years, show adult-like interference
from a partner when performing a joint task (Milward, Kita, & Apperly, 2014). This raises questions about the
cognitive skills involved in the development of such “corepresentation (CR)” of a partner (Sebanz, Knoblich,
& Prinz, 2003). Here, individual differences data from one hundred and thirteen 4- to 5-year-olds showed the-
ory of mind (ToM) and inhibitory control (IC) as predictors of ability to avoid CR interference, suggesting that
children with better ToM abilities are more likely to succeed in decoupling self and other representations in a
joint task, while better IC is likely to help children avoid interference from a partner’s response when selecting
their own response on the task.
Many have argued that children are able to partici-
pate in interactive, collaborative, and coordinated
tasks from an early age, with evidence coming from
naturalistic games such as throwing a ball back and
forth to one another (Hay, 1979) as well as more
controlled, artiﬁcial puzzle-solving tasks (Warne-
ken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006; Warneken, Gr€afen-
hain, & Tomasello, 2012). However, there has been
substantial disagreement about whether to interpret
these ﬁndings as involving high- or low-level cogni-
tive skills (Brownell, 2011). Two recent studies (Mil-
ward, Kita, & Apperly, 2014; Saby, Bouquet, &
Marshall, 2014) provided a new avenue for investi-
gating early joint action behaviors, by showing that
children exhibit adult-like interference effects result-
ing from corepresentation (CR; Sebanz, Knoblich, &
Prinz, 2003) of both one’s own and one’s partner’s
task in a joint action. That is, when two individuals
play two different roles in a joint action (e.g., one
responds to one set of stimuli and the other
responds to a complementary set), one’s perfor-
mance can be inﬂuenced by what the other person
has to do. Such an effect is evidence that partici-
pants represent not only their own task goal but
also the joint action partner’s task goal. In many
joint action scenarios, this should aid prediction of
a partner’s actions and so improve the quality of
the interaction (e.g., synchrony between actors).
However, in some situations, interference can be
caused by their representation of their partner’s
actions, and this effect has been exploited in experi-
mental settings to demonstrate the existence of CR.
In order to test whether high-level cognitive skills
are involved in CR effects, we carried out an indi-
vidual difference study, in which we examined
whether 4- to 5-year-olds’ performance on the CR
task in Milward et al. (2014) was associated with
their abilities in theory of mind (ToM), inhibitory
control (IC), and working memory (WM).
Bratman (1992) provides an inﬂuential deﬁnition
of joint action that requires, among other things, an
understanding of joint intentionality. In other
words, each participant in a joint task must under-
stand the other’s intention to perform certain
actions to reach a joint goal, and that both intend
for their action plans to mesh in order to achieve
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that mutual goal. Brownell (2011) points out that
this causes a problem for developmental psycholo-
gists who are studying a population with arguably
immature cognitive skills. Accordingly, one must
argue either that early behaviors show genuine joint
action understanding (as speciﬁed by Bratman,
1992) because they do have the prerequisite skills
required (Carpenter, 2009) or that one must explain
early behaviors through lower level skills because
young children lack the resources for such higher
level processing (Butterﬁll, 2011).
Many studies have found evidence for infants’
and preschoolers’ ability to perform actions that are
joint at least in some sense. In her review of this lit-
erature, Carpenter (2009) argues that infants have
all the prerequisites needed to perform joint action,
even by Bratman’s account. Such prerequisites
include understanding other’s goals and intentions
(Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005) and
understanding of common knowledge (Moll, Rich-
ter, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008). Behaviors used
as evidence for joint action include spontaneous
helping (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006: 18-month-
olds and chimpanzees), production of declarative
pointing in order to reach joint attention (Lisz-
kowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano, & Tomasello,
2004: 12-month-olds), and comprehension of a part-
ner’s pointing as related to a joint activity (Liebal,
Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009: 14-month-
olds). However, it is unclear whether any of these
behaviors require simultaneous and separate repre-
sentations of the intentions of self and other, which
are necessary for joint intentionality understanding.
Studies attempting speciﬁcally to demonstrate
joint intentionality understanding have used chil-
dren’s reengagement of a task partner as evidence of
such understanding. Most recently, Warneken et al.
(2012) found that children were more likely to
attempt to reengage a partner who stops participat-
ing in a joint task when they were unable rather
than unwilling to continue. These authors argue that
this is evidence that children at 1–2 years of age are
able to perform well on such tasks due to their abil-
ity to understand joint intentions. However, these
behaviors could also be explained via much more
low-level mechanisms (e.g., Brownell, 2011; Butterﬁll,
2011). For example, children do not need to be able
to understand intentions in order to view these two
conditions as different. Instead, they could under-
stand that in the “unable” condition there is a reason
why the experimenter stops participating (failure to
complete the action), whereas in the “unwilling”
condition there is not. Thus, it might be more fruitful
to attempt to reengage a partner who has failed for
a speciﬁc reason (e.g., lacking dexterity) that may be
overcome than one who has failed for a reason
unavailable to the child. To give an analogy, if my
computer fails to perform a task because it does not
have the software to do so, I can reengage the com-
puter to rectify this fairly simply by installing the
appropriate software. If it fails for no apparent rea-
son, I might just give up. This does not entail consid-
eration of the computer having mental states.
Likewise, Butterﬁll (2011) points out that children
could use lower level behavioral goal tracking, rather
than intention understanding, in order to perform
tasks with others. Thus, there is, as yet, no clear evi-
dence for the involvement of mental state under-
standing in early joint action behaviors that cannot
be explained through lower level mechanisms.
Recent evidence for CR in young children (Mil-
ward et al., 2014; Saby et al., 2014) could shed
some light on this problem. CR is a mechanism that
has been used to explain interference effects
between self and other when two individuals
engage in a joint action. The original proponents of
this explanation (Sebanz et al., 2003) found interfer-
ence effects on a joint Simon task that were similar
to the interference effects found on an individual
Simon task. Participants were presented with a
hand with an extended index ﬁnger either pointing
to left or right. The ﬁnger wore either a green or
red ring, depending on the trial. Participants’ task
was to press a button on the left of the keyboard
for one color and on the right for the other, and the
direction in which the hand on the screen pointed
was not relevant to their responses. In an individ-
ual two-response task, participants were required to
respond to both green and red rings with the two
buttons. Compatibility effects were found whereby
responses were slower when the pointing direction
of the ﬁnger was incompatible with the location of
the correct response button. In a joint version, the
task was divided between two actors, so that each
was responsible for either green or red rings, and
thus for only one response each. The same compati-
bility effects were also observed in this task, which
was surprising given that no such effects were
found in an individual, single response task in
which a single participant had to respond to a sin-
gle button alone (without a joint actor).
This original effect was explained as being due
to participants in the joint action condition “corep-
resenting” their task partner and therefore being
subject to interference from the representation of
the alternative part of the task, which was not rep-
resented in an individual, single response version.
Thus, this is evidence for the involvement of
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simultaneous representation of self and other in
adult joint action, which sometimes interfere with
one another. This is particularly interesting given
that participants were not explicitly asked to work
toward a joint goal or to take into consideration the
other person’s actions or task in any way. The fact
that they did this any way suggests a mechanism
of joint action involving self–other representation
that is more implicit and shows stronger character-
istics of automaticity than those implied by the
developmental studies reviewed above (Carpenter,
2009). Tasks of this nature could therefore be a
promising way to study the processes underlying
early joint actions, because they meet some of the
criteria for an action to be joint—simultaneous rep-
resentation of self and other—but do not entail
explicit understanding of mutually constrained
intentions (Bratman, 1992).
Recently, two studies have indeed found similar
effects in children (Milward et al., 2014; Saby et al.,
2014). Using different methodologies, each analo-
gous to Sebanz et al.’s (2003) methods, these studies
both found CR effects after the age of 4 years. In
the task employed by Milward et al. (2014), children
were presented with trials in which they saw either
a bear or a duck. In one condition (same task), both
participants had to press their button when they
saw one of the animals (e.g., bear) and inhibit
responding to the other (e.g., duck). In the other con-
dition (different task), each participant had to
respond to a different animal (e.g., one to the bear
and one to the duck). Results showed that perfor-
mance was worse in the different task condition,
suggesting that children had corepresented their
partner’s task and therefore experienced interference
when that task was different from their own. Addi-
tionally, Milward et al. (2014) failed to ﬁnd CR
effects in a younger age group aged 2–3 years.
This apparent developmental cutoff point at
4 years suggests CR may be a mechanism of joint
action that only develops after this age. If this is the
case, it is important to ask what cognitive processes
are linked to the onset of CR and its subsequent
interference effects. Two obvious potential contribu-
tors are ToM (although see Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, &
Liepelt, 2013 for a nonsocial explanation of interfer-
ence effects) and executive abilities that show sig-
niﬁcant development between 3 and 5 years.
Investigation of the former can also speak to the
argument surrounding the involvement of represen-
tational capacities in joint action in young children.
In relation to ToM, one clear possibility is that
developing ToM abilities allow children to construct
representations of their task partner’s intentions
and so engage in CR. In terms of observable effects
on the bear–duck task (as employed by Milward
et al., 2014), this would mean that developing ToM
abilities would lead to representation of the partner’s
task as well as the child’s own, giving rise to the
interference effects that are indicative of CR. This pos-
sibility would explain why CR effects have only been
found at age 4 years, as this corresponds with typical
onset of explicit false belief understanding. Thus, chil-
dren younger than 4 might only represent their own
part of the task, completely ignoring and subse-
quently experiencing no interference from a partner’s
role. This would ﬁt with the body of research on ego-
centrism in perspective taking in early childhood
(Doherty, 2008; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).
The prediction that the development of ToM abili-
ties enables CR would also ﬁt with ﬁndings that CR
in adults involves mental state understanding. For
example, Humphreys and Bedford (2011) found that
patients with lesions associated with ToM deﬁcits
did not show spatial compatibility effects in a joint
Simon task, whereas they did so in an individual
version. These patients showed deﬁcits on measures
of false belief understanding, suggesting not only
that ToM but speciﬁcally belief comprehension is
necessary for CR. Other studies looking at mental
state understanding and the social Simon effect have
focused on intention understanding as a prerequisite
for CR. Tsai, Kuo, Hung, and Tzeng (2008) found
behavioral and electrophysiological effects of com-
patibility when participants were told they were per-
forming a Simon task with a human partner but not
when told they were playing alongside a computer.
Likewise, using a joint Flanker task, Atmaca, Sebanz,
and Knoblich (2011) found that participants only
showed compatibility effects in a joint task when
their partner’s actions were intentional rather than
when they were controlled by a magnet. Thus, if CR
requires explicit mental state understanding, and
explicit mental state understanding only develops at
around 4–5 years, this would explain why studies
have failed to show CR effects below this age.
However, the long-standing idea that develop-
ments in ToM may give rise to improvements in
executive self-control (e.g., Perner, 1991) predicts
the opposite relationship, whereby improving ToM
leads to reduced interference from CR of the part-
ner. On this account, whatever the developmental
origin of CR effects, one consequence of advances
in ToM would be that children are better able to
maintain separate, stable representations of “self”
and “other” and their respective roles during a joint
task. In Perner’s (1991) original conception develop-
ing ToM provided metacognitive abilities that
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enabled self-control through domain-general
improvements in executive control. However, an
alternative conception arises from recent work sug-
gesting that there may be a social-speciﬁc control
mechanism involved in decoupling of self and other
representations, which has been shown to be dis-
tinct from general IC and other processes associated
with ToM (Schuwerk et al., 2014).
Recently, several researchers have put forward
the idea that self–other distinction may, in fact, be
an overarching mechanism in social cognition that
links processing in motor, cognitive, and affective
domains (Decety & Lamm, 2007; Santiesteban et al.,
2012; Sowden & Catmur, 2015; Spengler, von Cra-
mon, & Brass, 2009). For example, Santiesteban
et al. (2012) carried out a training study whereby
training of imitation inhibition on a ﬁnger-tapping
(motor domain) task transferred to improvements
in visual perspective taking (cognitive domain).
They argued that this training improved partici-
pants’ ability to maintain and manipulate distinct
representations of self and other, which is a mecha-
nism that is common across domains in social cog-
nition in general and has been linked to commonly
identiﬁed “social” brain areas, including medial
prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction. Of
course, this prediction that improving ToM leads to
reduced interference from the partner’s task once
the ability to corepresent is established leaves open
the possibility that at an earlier stage in develop-
ment, developing ToM abilities (speciﬁcally relating
to construction of representations of self and other
rather than resolving conﬂict between the two) con-
tribute to the onset of CR. Thus, our two predic-
tions about the relationship between CR and ToM
are not mutually exclusive across the full course of
development, but they do result in opposite predic-
tions for a given age range. The current study aims
to distinguish between these two predictions.
By looking at the relationship between CR inter-
ference effects and ToM in children who already
show evidence of CR, we can investigate ﬁrst
whether there is any relationship with ToM at all,
and second what is the direction of this relation-
ship. If CR interference effects increase with devel-
oping ToM, then the ﬁrst of our predictions, that
ToM plays a role in establishing CR (i.e., construct-
ing self and other representations), is supported. If
CR interference decreases with developing ToM,
then the second prediction, that ToM helps children
to resolve conﬂict between self- and other-tagged
representations, is supported.
In addition to ToM, another cognitive skill that
undergoes signiﬁcant improvement at around
4–5 years is general IC capacity (Carlson, 2010).
Tasks used in both adult and developmental CR
research, such as the Social Simon (Sebanz et al.,
2003) and Joint Flanker tasks (Atmaca et al., 2011)
have made use of IC to demonstrate how represent-
ing a partner during a joint task can be detrimental
when trying to inhibit a stimulus or stimulus feature
on which one’s partner is acting. This leads to the
reasonable expectation that IC will continue to be a
key demand in CR tasks in that CR makes it more
difﬁcult to inhibit competing task features. This
could be the case whether or not there is also a
social-speciﬁc component to task performance, and
also whether participants represent their partner’s
task as such (i.e., “my” task vs. “your” task), or
whether they simply represent the other part of the
task without relating it to another agent ([“My”]
Task A vs. Task B). When representing a partner,
one needs to inhibit the other task role so that they
do not interfere with one’s own actions or task role.
Thus, a greater ability to inhibit the other task role
should lead to better performance on a joint task.
In the task employed by Milward et al. (2014),
the same task should not require inhibiting the other
person’s task/action (although inhibition is required
in general to complete the task), because there is no
competition between participants’ responses. If any-
thing, inhibiting one’s partner should slow responses.
In contrast, the different task should require inhibition
to resist interference from the partner’s (different)
task. Therefore, it is possible that individual differ-
ences in performance on the different task could be
modulated, not only by the level to which a person
corepresents a partner but also by their capacity for
inhibiting the alternative task response option in
order to avoid interference. Thus, performance on IC
measures should be positively related to performance
on a CR task. This should be particularly so for con-
ﬂict IC tasks, given that both involve conﬂict between
two rules rather than a simple delay in response
(Carlson & Moses, 2001). This is analogous to the CR
task, where there is a conﬂict between one’s own rule
and ones partner’s rule, even though switching
between the two is not explicitly required.
Another executive skill that may be involved in
CR tasks is WM. Participants must remember their
task rule and maintain this while completing the
task. If they are to corepresent, they also need to
remember the other person’s task rule, particularly
in versions of the task where participants cannot
see each other. This is likely to be highly important
in real-world joint action scenarios, which often
require adaptation of actions in order to coordinate
with a partner. In order to do this, it is necessary to
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understand the partner’s role in the task. This may
also be relevant to experimental designs where
tasks with identical versus complementary roles are
used, as it is vital to ensure that task types are
matched for WM demands. By identifying the role
of WM in both conditions in the current study,
direct evidence can be obtained as to whether WM
has a confounding inﬂuence on these tasks.
Set shifting was also considered as a possible
measure here, it being generally acknowledged as
one of the key components in executive function
alongside WM and IC (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson,
Witzi, & Howerter, 2000). However, this was con-
sidered to be less relevant than the latter compo-
nents, as the go–no-go task employed here does not
require participants to act upon two rules which
they must switch between. Instead, they must act
upon one rule and avoid conﬂict from an irrelevant
rule, as in conﬂict IC tasks as outlined above.
Each of these cognitive skills has been exten-
sively investigated in terms of individual differ-
ences in children’s abilities and how these
differences relate to other cognitive constructs (Carl-
son, Moses, & Breton, 2002) as well as real-world
outcomes (Blair & Razza, 2007). The question of
which capacities might be involved in CR will help
us explain the developmental trajectory that we see
in early CR tasks. For this reason, the following
experiment investigates the relationship between
individual differences in WM, IC, ToM, and CR.
Speciﬁcally, it focuses on which cognitive skills pre-
dict individual performance on the computerized
corepresentation task from Experiment 3 in Mil-
ward et al. (2014). Given that we are interested in
abilities related to CR rather than general joint task
requirements, the measure of interest is perfor-
mance on the different task once abilities shared
with the same task have been controlled for.
In order to increase validity of the measures
used, multiple tasks were administered for each
cognitive construct. Tasks were taken from existing
studies that have looked at individual differences in
executive functions and ToM that have used a simi-
lar age range to that in the current study. WM was
measured using Backward Digit Span and Count-
ing and Labeling tasks, based on Carlson et al.
(2002). IC was measured using Day–Night (Ger-
stadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994) and Pictures tasks
(Burns, Riggs, & Beck, 2012). The Day–Night task
was converted into a computer task in order to
measure response times (RTs) as well as accuracy.
Because the relationship between ToM and
development of CR has not yet been studied, it is
not clear which type of mental state representation
might be involved. For this reason, a scale made up
of three tasks was implemented in this study, based
on Wellman and Liu’s (2004) ToM scale, from
which the following tasks were selected according
to developmental suitability: knowledge access,
contents false belief, and real apparent emotion.
Age and receptive vocabulary were measured as
control variables. ToM ability could be correlated
with performance on CR tasks (i.e., ability to avoid
interference from a partner and thereby perform
well) in one of two ways: (a) a negative correlation
because ToM allows children to represent a partner
during a joint task, (b) a positive correlation
because ToM helps children to separate representa-
tions of self and other and thus avoid interference.
To summarize, we investigated whether 4- to 5-
year-olds’ performance on CR tasks is correlated
positively with IC and WM and correlated either
positively or negatively with ToM.
Method
Participants
Participants were one hundred and ﬁfteen 4- to
5-year-olds (Mage = 61.68 months, range = 48–
69 months, 60 male) sampled from Birmingham’s
Think Tank Science Museum (n = 30), two from the
primary schools in the Birmingham area (n = 18),
and three from the Northamptonshire area (n = 67)
between April 2013 and March 2014. The sample
was from several schools with diverse intakes, con-
sisting of approximately 90% Caucasian, 7% Asian/
British Asian, and 3% Black/African/Carribbean
children from working–middle class backgrounds
(estimated from census data for each county, Ofﬁce
for National Statistics, 2011). Two participants from
Northamptonshire schools failed to complete all
tasks and were excluded from analyses. All other
participants carried out all tasks and all conditions
of each task in a within-subjects design.
Design and Procedure
Children were tested in a separate room, quiet
corridor area, or reading corner of the schools or
museum. Tasks were divided into two 15- to 20-
min sessions in order to give children a rest
between blocks. Depending on school classroom
routines, for children in schools there was a period
of a minimum of 1 hr to a maximum of 20 hr
between completing the ﬁrst block and starting the
second session of tasks. Tasks consisted of one CR
measure, three ToM measures (ToM), two WM
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measures, and two IC measures, and the British
Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS). The BPVS was
included to make sure that any of the relationships
of interest between CR, ToM, WM, and IC cannot
be simply attributed to individual differences in
language development. Tasks were administered in
a ﬁxed order. Session 1: bear/duck (CR), knowl-
edge access (ToM), contents false belief (ToM), real
apparent emotion (ToM), backward digit span
(WM). Session 2: day–night Stroop (IC), counting
and labeling (WM), pictures (IC); BPVS.
Measures
Receptive Vocabulary Measure
The BPVS, 2nd ed. (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, &
Burley, 1997) was fully administered to all children.
This involved verbally presenting a word along
with a card displaying four pictures, from which
children were required to select the matching pic-
ture. Children were tested on a series of trials until
reaching a failure criterion.
Working Memory Measures
Backward digit span. The methodology for this
task was taken from Carlson et al. (2002). Children
were introduced to a puppet called Ernie and told,
“Ernie is being very silly. Everything I say, he says
backwards! Like this, if I say the numbers ‘1, 2’ he
says ‘2, 1’! Do you think you can do what Ernie
has done and say things backwards?” Participants
then had a two-digit practice trial, on which they
were corrected if they got the answer wrong, fol-
lowed by three test trials with two, three, and four
digits, respectively. Participants obtained a score
out of four.
Counting and labeling. The methodology for this
task was taken from Carlson et al. (2002), and the
script is provided in Appendix S1. Children were
introduced to a set of toys that they ﬁrst had to
count, then label, and ﬁnally count and label simul-
taneously.
Inhibitory control measures
Day–night Stroop. This task was adapted from
the classic day–night Stroop task (Gerstadt et al.,
1994) in a computerized version using EPrime 2
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Sharpsburg, PA,
USA). Children were required to press a button
with a picture of the moon and stars on when they
heard a recorded voice say the word “day” and to
press a button with a picture of the sun on when
they heard “night.” Computer presentation made it
possible to record both accuracy and RT. Partici-
pants completed 4 practice trials and 16 test trials.
Trials commenced upon completion of the previous
trial, giving no time limit on responses.
Pictures task. This task was identical to that used
in Burns et al. (2012). Children participated in a
computer game in which they saw a picture of
either a monkey or a cat appear on the screen. They
were required to press one of two buttons, one of
which corresponded with the cat (and displayed a
sticker with the same cat picture) and one with the
monkey (displaying a monkey sticker). These but-
tons were placed 20 cm apart, with one on the left-
and one on the right-hand side of the laptop screen.
Pictures on the computer were also displayed either
on the left- or right-hand side, so that half of the tri-
als (n = 10) were congruent with the side on which
the corresponding animal button was situated and
half were incongruent. Participants completed a
total of 4 practice and 20 test trials.
Theory-of-Mind Measures
ToM measures were taken from Wellman and
Liu’s (2004) ToM scale. Only three of the original
tasks from the ﬁve-task scale were employed, due
to the smaller age range being tested here and the
age appropriateness of selected tasks.
Knowledge access. This task tests for understand-
ing that others will not have knowledge of an event
they were not present for. Participants were shown
a Lego drawer and asked, “What do you think is
inside the drawer?” The experimenter then opened
the drawer to reveal a plastic monkey, “Let’s see
. . . Look, there’s really a monkey inside!” She then
closed the drawer, “Ok, so what is in the drawer?”
After the child’s response, the experimenter said,
“Polly has never seen inside this drawer. Now here
comes Polly.” A plastic doll was then brought into
view. The test question, “So, does Polly know what
is in the drawer?” was then asked, followed by the
memory check question, “Did Polly see inside the
drawer?” In order to score correctly, children had
to respond “no” to both of these questions.
Contents false belief. This tests understanding that
others can have a belief that is different from real-
ity. Children were presented with a plaster (“Band-
Aid”) box. They were ﬁrst asked, “What do you
think is in the plaster box?” after which the box
was opened to reveal a toy pig, “Look, it’s really a
pig inside!” The box was then closed and the child
was asked, “Ok, so what is in the plaster box?”
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Once the child had answered, the experimenter
said, “Peter has never seen inside this plaster box.
Now here comes Peter.” A different plastic doll
was then brought into view and the test question
was asked, “So, what does Peter think is in the box,
plasters or a pig?” This was followed by the mem-
ory check question, “Did Peter see inside the box?”
Children had to respond “plasters” and “no,”
respectively, in order to score correctly on this task.
Real apparent emotion. This tests understanding
that individuals can portray different emotions
from those which they are actually experiencing.
Children were told a story about a boy who
wanted to hide how he felt about an event. In
the story, another child had called the boy names,
which had made him feel sad. However, he tried
to hide how he felt so that the other children
would not think he was a baby (see Appendix S1
for full script). Children were asked a memory
check question, “How did the boy really feel
when everyone laughed, did he feel happy, sad,
or ok?” They were given a sheet with three faces
on (one happy, one neutral and one sad) which
they could point to in response. They were then
asked the test question, “How did he try to look
on his face when everyone laughed, did he try to
look happy, sad, or ok?” Children had to respond
with a more negative emotion for the memory
check question than for the test question in order
to gain a score of 1.
Corepresentation task
This task was modiﬁed from the computer task
employed in Milward et al. (2014, Experiment 3)
in order to make it suitable for use within sub-
jects. The task was a go–no-go task, adapted from
the classic bear/dragon test of IC (Kochanska,
Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & Vandegeest, 1996).
Pairs of participants (always a child and the exper-
imenter) each had a response button that they had
to press in response to one of two stimuli accord-
ing to a given rule. For example, one might have
to respond to a picture of a duck but inhibit
responding to a bear. In contrast to Milward et al.
(2014), the current task consisted of two rather
than three blocks of 12 bear and duck trials. This
was in order to allow an equal number of blocks
before and after the switch. A second EPrime pro-
gram was designed that had an identical structure
to the ﬁrst program, but rather than presenting
bear and duck stimuli, they presented pictures of
a pig and a penguin (see Figure S1). This was so
that representations of stimuli from the ﬁrst (same)
task could not inﬂuence those in the second (dif-
ferent) task, and to aid children’s understanding of
the different rules for each task.
Pilot data found an effect of task type (same vs.
different) in a within-subjects design only when the
same condition was presented ﬁrst and the different
condition was presented second. This is unlikely to
have been caused solely by children getting tired or
bored and thus declining in performance over time,
because if this were the case, then such a decline
should also occur when the same condition was
presented second. One possibility was that there
would be a carryover effect when the different task
was presented ﬁrst, in that children continued to
represent the other task in the same task condition
having done so in the preceding different task con-
dition. For this reason, tasks were presented in a
ﬁxed order with the same condition ﬁrst and then
different condition second.
Each child completed both conditions with a dif-
ferent version of the EPrime program (bear/duck
or pig/penguin) for each condition. The order of
presentation of each program was counterbalanced
so that half of the participants completed the bear/
duck version in the same condition and half in the
different condition, and likewise for the pig/pen-
guin version. Children completed the solo practice,
joint practice, and same condition as in Milward
et al. (2014). Once the same condition had been
completed, children were asked a comprehension
question and then given the instructions for the dif-
ferent condition (example given is for same task
with bear as target, different task with pig as
child’s target), “Now we’re going to do something
different. This time your job is to spot the Pig. So
whenever you see the Pig, you should press your
button as fast as you can. But, if you see the Pen-
guin, you shouldn’t press your button. You just
stay still and don’t press anything at all. My job is
to spot the Penguin. So whenever I see the Penguin
I’m going to press my button as fast as I can. But,
if I see the Pig, I’m not going to press my button,
I’m just going to stay still and not press anything at
all.” A further joint practice was then administered
using the new stimulus set and new rules. The sec-
ond EPrime program was then loaded and children
completed the different condition, followed by a
comprehension question.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics for all tasks are presented in
Table 1. Results will be presented in two stages.
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First, composite measures will be described and
correlational analyses carried out to identify rela-
tions between all measures. Regression analyses
will then be carried out in order to identify the con-
tribution of factors to CR.
Composite Measures
Inhibitory Control
Day–night Stroop. Accuracy and RTs were
recorded for this task. RTs were analyzed only for
correct responses. Responses with RTs below
250 ms and above 3 SD from the mean
(6,335.77 ms) were excluded. In order to combine
accuracy and RTs in a composite measure for per-
formance, values were converted into z scores and
signs were reversed for RT z scores so that, as for
accuracy, higher scores signiﬁed better perfor-
mance. z Scores for accuracy and RTs were then
added together. This was as an alternative to
inverse efﬁciency scores, which also combine infor-
mation from accuracy and RT, but which are
argued to be unsuitable for scores with error rates
over 10% (Bruyer & Brysbaert, 2011). Because the
task always required IC, the composite performance
measure is the inhibition ability score. The higher
the performance, the stronger the inhibition ability.
The composite performance score for this task will
be referred to as “day–night composite” henceforth.
Pictures. Accuracy and RTs were recorded for
both congruent and incongruent conditions of this
task. RTs were analyzed only for correct responses.
A measure of the inhibitory ability of this task was
calculated in three steps. First, for each condition,
we calculated the composite performance measure,
based on both accuracy and RT, in the same way
as for the day–night Stroop. In this performance
measure, a higher value indicates better perfor-
mance. Second, the composite performance measure
in the congruent condition was regressed from that
in the incongruent condition. Third, the inhibition
ability scores were calculated as residuals for this
regression model. That is, the inhibition ability of a
given participant was measured as how much his
or her performance in the incongruent condition
deviated from that expected from his or her perfor-
mance in the congruent condition, based on the
regression model; thus, a bigger positive residual
indicates a better inhibition ability. This inhibition
ability score will be referred to as “picture residual
score” henceforth.
This approach was ﬁrst proposed by DeGutis,
Wilmer, Mercado, and Cohan (2013). The method
uses residuals to calculate the variance of a factor
of interest (inhibition ability) that is present in the
experimental condition (the incongruent case) but
not in the control condition (the congruent condi-
tion) while controlling for variance shared between
the two conditions. The advantage of this method
can be illustrated by the fact that residuals (inhibi-
tion ability) do not correlate with the performance
in the control condition (the congruent condition).
A larger value for picture residual score indicates a
better inhibition ability. The residual method was
used as an alternative to the subtraction method,
where the performance in the control condition
(congruent condition) is subtracted from that in the
experimental condition (incongruent condition) in
order to produce a measure of a factor of interest
(inhibition ability). The weakness of the subtraction
method can be illustrated by the fact that the result-
ing difference score correlates with the performance
in the control condition. That is, the difference score
is “contaminated” by factors relevant for the perfor-
mance of the control condition (congruent condi-
tion).
Corepresentation. Accuracy and RTs were
recorded for same and different conditions. There
was a descriptive difference between the two condi-
tions for both accuracy and RTs (see Table 1).
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for All Tasks
Task
Mean score (SD)
Accuracy RT
Receptive vocabulary
BPVS raw score 54.12 (11.24)
Working memory
Backward digit span (0–4) 1.63 (1.40)
Counting and labeling (0–2) 0.95 (0.94)
Total correct answers (0–6) 2.59 (1.99)
Inhibitory control
Pictures: congruent 94% (11) 1,240.94 (204.83)
Pictures: incongruent 90% (13) 1,393.87 (210.70)
Day–night Stroop 86% (25) 1,618.49 (325.50)
Theory of mind
Knowledge access 82% (38)
Contents false belief 57% (50)
Real apparent emotion 27% (45)
Total correct answers (0–3) 1.66 (0.90)
Corepresentation
Same task 85% (11) 727.32 (116.90)
Different task 83% (13) 751.25 (101.30)
Note. RTs were analyzed only for correct responses. BPVS = Bri-
tish Picture Vocabulary Scale; RTs = response times.
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Paired samples t tests highlighted a signiﬁcant dif-
ference between conditions for correct RTs, t
(107) = 2.56, p = .01, but not for accuracy, t
(111) = 1.66, p = .10. This replicates the effect of
task type in RTs in a previous version of this task
(Experiment 3 in Milward et al., 2014) that found a
between-subjects difference in task type, and pilot
data that found a within-subjects difference. In
order to create a composite score for CR, RT, and
accuracy values for each condition were converted
into z scores and added together within each condi-
tion to create a speed–accuracy composite (revers-
ing signs for RTs so that higher values indicate
better performance). This gave a mean of .86
(SD = 1.06) for the same task and .84 (SD = 1.08)
for the different task. Next, residuals were calcu-
lated in the same way as for the pictures task (fol-
lowing DeGutis et al., 2013), by regressing the same
task composite from the different task composite
and calculating the inhibition ability score as resid-
uals for this regression model. Variance that is
unique to the different condition is the most inter-
esting, as only in this condition CR is expected to
show an effect of conﬂict with a partner. The resid-
ual score will be referred to as “CR residual score”
henceforth (the higher the score, the better the per-
formance and lower the interference from CR). For
readers interested in descriptive statistics and corre-
lations for composite scores prior to residual calcu-
lations (see Table S1). These may be more
indicative of general task requirements in this type
of joint task rather than those speciﬁc to CR inter-
ference.
Correlations. First, where there were multiple
tasks within a single domain (WM, IC, and ToM),
task means were entered into Pearson’s correla-
tional analyses. Note that a higher value indicates
better performance in BPVS, ToM scores, WM
scores, and the inhibition score (better inhibition
ability). Backward digit span and counting and
labeling correlated signiﬁcantly, r(113) = .43,
p < .001, and were therefore added together to cre-
ate an overall WM score (“working memory total,”
henceforth). Day–night Stroop and pictures residual
score did not correlate, r(111) = .02, p = .81. For this
reason, further analyses included both a total inhi-
bition score (by adding day–night Stroop composite
and pictures residual score, “inhibition total” hence-
forth) as well as each of the individual inhibition
measures independently. Of the three ToM tasks,
only knowledge access and contents false belief cor-
related signiﬁcantly, r(111) = .39, p < .001. For this
reason, the three ToM tasks were analyzed sepa-
rately as well as including a total ToM score by
adding all three task scores (“ToM total,” hence-
forth).
Age and receptive vocabulary correlations. An over-
all Pearson’s correlation matrix can be seen in
Table 2. Age in months correlated with receptive
vocabulary, WM total, and day–night composite.
Receptive vocabulary correlated with all three ToM
measures, ToM total, WM total, day–night compos-
ite, and CR. This is consistent with existing litera-
ture demonstrating the development of WM,
inhibition, and ToM at this age (Carlson, 2010; Carl-
son et al., 2002).
Executive function and ToM correlations. WM total
and inhibition total correlated with each other sig-
niﬁcantly, r(107) = .26, p = .006. This remained sig-
niﬁcant after age and receptive vocabulary had
been partialed out, r(104) = .20, p = .04. This corre-
lation was descriptively weaker than that found
between the two WM measures, r(113) = .43,
p < .001, which is consistent with Miyake et al.’s
(2000) prediction that executive function measures
should correlate with one another but more
strongly between measures of the same type of
executive component. However, inhibition mea-
sures did not correlate with one another. This was
unexpected, given that they are both conﬂict inhibi-
tion tasks, where participants are required to inhibit
a conﬂicting stimulus in order to respond to a tar-
get.
One possible explanation is that the day–night
task in this study did not feature congruent trials as
a control measure, whereas the pictures task did so.
Therefore, the composite scores for each task are
slightly different, in that the day–night composite
does not control for factors that may be involved in
performance beyond IC. Additionally, whereas the
day–night composite is determined by a partici-
pant’s ability to retain in mind and act upon a rule
that conﬂicts with a prepotent response, the pic-
tures task measures ability to switch between
inhibiting a prepotent response on incongruent tri-
als while acting consistently with it on congruent
trials. Furthermore, the competing element in the
pictures task is spatial, whereas the day–night is
conceptual. In conclusion, there are reasons to
explain the lack of correlation here, although it was
unexpected given previous ﬁndings that within
domain executive function tasks are correlated
(Miyake et al., 2000).
Two of the ToM measures correlated with WM
total, knowledge access: r(111) = .34, p < .001; con-
tents false belief: r(111) = .35, p < .001. These results
remained similar once age in months and receptive
vocabulary had been partialed out (signiﬁcant
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correlations between WM total and knowledge
access, r(104) = .25, p = .01, and between pictures
residual score and real apparent emotion, r
(104) = .21, p = .03.
CR and cognitive measures. The CR residual score
correlated with knowledge access, r(106) = .19,
p < .05, ToM total, r(106) = .26, p < .01, WM total, r
(106) = .20, p < .04, day–night composite, r
(106) = .36, p = .001, and inhibition total, r
(101) = .27, p < .01. Regression analyses were car-
ried out in order to identify which relationships
remained signiﬁcant predictors once other variables
were controlled for.
Regression analyses. The CR residual score was
used as the dependent variable. This score mea-
sures the unique variance in the performance of the
different condition, after controlling for the perfor-
mance in the same condition (DeGutis et al., 2013).
Only in the different condition, CR is expected to
show an effect of conﬂict with a partner’s task;
thus, this score is a good measure of the strength of
CR (the lower the score, the stronger the interfer-
ence effect due to CR of the partner).
A multiple linear regression was carried out with
CR residual score as the dependent variable and
age in months, BPVS raw score, inhibition total,
WM total, and ToM total as the predictor variables
in a single model using enter method (see Table 3).
The overall model was signiﬁcant, F(5, 97) = 3.63,
p = .005, with inhibition total and ToM total as the
only signiﬁcant predictors within the model (inhibi-
tion total: b = .12, t = 2.34, p = .02; ToM total:
b = .20, t = 2.13, p = .04).
Two hierarchical regressions were subsequently
carried out in order to obtain R2 values for each of
these signiﬁcant predictors. The ﬁrst regression was
identical to the initial regression model but entering
inhibition total in a second step (R2 change = .047,
p = .02). The second was identical to the initial
model but entering ToM total in a second step (R2
change = .04, p = .035). The positive signiﬁcant bs
and R2 values indicate that both Inhibition and
ToM contribute independently to individual scores
on the CR residual score. More speciﬁcally, partici-
pants who have stronger inhibition abilities and
stronger ToM abilities showed better performance
on (i.e., less interference from the joint action part-
ner’s role in) the CR task.
General Discussion
We found independent roles of both ToM and IC in
performance on the CR task as measured by residu-
als between same and different tasks. More speciﬁ-
cally, ToM and IC each had an independent
positive relationship with the ability to avoid inter-
ference from a partner in a joint task (i.e., less con-
ﬂict in the different task condition of the CR task).
This suggests that ToM and IC are involved in joint
action in 4- to 5-year-olds. Additionally, although
WM correlated with the CR task, this was not
found to contribute once other factors had been
included in a regression model. This, along with
the fact that age, receptive vocabulary, and WM
were controlled for in these analyses, suggests a
speciﬁc role of ToM and IC, which goes beyond a
more general maturation in cognitive ability that
would be shared between all of these measures.
These ﬁndings will be discussed in the following
paragraphs.
The ﬁnding regarding IC is consistent with the
prediction that this ability is required in order to
avoid interference caused by corepresenting a part-
ner in the different task condition. Participants with
stronger inhibition abilities performed better on the
different task once controlling for the same task.
The fact that this effect was independent of ToM
score suggests that general executive abilities are
additionally involved in corepresenting a partner
during a joint task, beyond any speciﬁcally social
abilities measured by the ToM task. It is important
to distinguish such general inhibitory processes
from self–other conﬂict resolution processes that are
speciﬁc to ToM and have been shown to depend on
different brain regions to those used for general IC
(Samson, Houthuys, & Humphreys, 2015).
The ﬁnding regarding ToM is consistent with the
prediction that ToM helps children to perform bet-
ter on CR tasks because it helps them to clearly dif-
ferentiate and separate task representations of self
Table 3
Regression Output for Multiple Regression With Corepresentation
Residual Score as the Dependent Variable and Age in Months, BPVS
Raw Score, ToM Total, Working Memory Total, and Inhibitory Con-
trol Total as Predictors
B SE b t Sig.
(Constant) .305 1.031 0.296 .768
Age in months .007 0.017 .044 0.432 .666
BPVS raw .006 0.009 .077 0.690 .492
ToM total .207 0.097 .223 2.133 .035
Working memory total .030 0.048 .071 0.623 .535
Inhibition total .122 0.052 .228 2.339 .021
Note. BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale; ToM = theory of
mind.
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and other. This makes sense if one considers the
nature of the tasks implemented in the ToM scale
used here. All three of these tasks involve being
able to separate one’s own mental state from that
of a protagonist. In the knowledge access task,
one’s own state of knowing must be separated from
that of a protagonists’ state of naivety. This is simi-
lar for the contents false belief task, although here
the content of one’s own belief must be separated
from the incorrect belief of the other. In the real
apparent emotion task, one needs to separate one’s
own knowledge of the protagonist’s true emotion
from that portrayed on his face. Many frameworks
for ToM have suggested that it is not a unitary con-
struct but rather involves separate processes for
construction of representations of self and other
versus resolving conﬂict between these representa-
tions (e.g., Apperly, 2010; Carlson & Moses, 2001;
Doherty, 2008; Frith & Frith, 2006; Leslie & Thaiss,
1992). The current results provide evidence that the
latter ToM process is involved in CR, enabling con-
ﬂict resolution between one’s own and one’s part-
ner’s task. Note that this analysis applies even
when the “other” perspective is actually one’s past
self, as in the representational change task (Asting-
ton & Gopnik, 1988) in which children ﬁnd it as
difﬁcult to report their own prior false belief as they
do someone else’s current false belief. However, it
is not clear whether the same analysis applies to all
tasks involving differences between self and other,
which vary both in the age at which children ﬁrst
succeed, and in the nature of the perspective prob-
lem that is posed (see Rakoczy, 2010 for a discus-
sion).
It is possible that this ﬁnding of a role of self–
other distinction is due to it being a shared mecha-
nism between multiple social domains, including
ToM and CR. This is an interesting avenue to inves-
tigate further in the context of joint action, which
may require processing of multiple types of social
information from motor, cognitive, and even affec-
tive domains in unison, and therefore could beneﬁt
from a shared self–other distinction mechanism
across these domains. It should be noted, however,
that the conclusion that the self–other distinction
component of ToM is involved in CR does not rule
out the possibility that the representation construc-
tion component may not play an additional role,
perhaps at a younger age than tested here. This
should be addressed in future research.
One possibility for future research is to investigate
the role of set shifting on CR. Although considered
less theoretically relevant than conﬂict IC in the cur-
rent study, there is perhaps reason to consider it in
the future. This is because some researchers have
suggested that CR may be a mechanism for turn tak-
ing in joint action (Wenke et al., 2011), whereby par-
ticipants represent not what their partner is doing
but whose turn it is to act. In this case, one might not
need to activate one rule about a stimulus–response
sequence (“bear” = go) and inhibit the other
(“duck” = no-go), but rather switch between two
rules about whose turn it is to act (“bear” = my
turn” vs. “duck” = your turn). If set shifting did
contribute independently beyond conﬂict IC, it
might shed some light on this argument.
The current ﬁndings suggest that higher level
abilities such as ToM and IC are involved in joint
action by 4- to 5-year-olds. This ﬁnding is impor-
tant in light of the discussion of how to interpret
children’s ability to engage in joint action (Brow-
nell, 2011). Some (e.g., Warneken et al., 2012) argue
that children’s joint action is underpinned by higher
level cognitive abilities to represent partners, but
others (e.g., Butterﬁll, 2011 and our discussion in
the introduction of the current article) cautioned
that accounts based on low-level cognitive abilities
may be possible for previous ﬁndings. The study
reported here suggests that at least at this age, chil-
dren do employ higher level abilities. Clearly it is
possible that lower level skills can provide children
with the means to participate in activities that may
be considered joint in some important respects at a
younger age. For example, even 12-month-olds will
choose social partners based on their degree of
movement synchrony with the infant (Tunҫgenҫ,
Cohen, & Fawcett, 2015), suggesting a sensitivity to
interpersonal relations that could result in active
selection of desirable action partners. Goal tracking
may also be an earlier-developing skill that helps
children to engage jointly with others (Butterﬁll,
2011). Preschoolers may also understand the poten-
tial of a partner to be used as a social tool to
achieve their own goal (Warneken et al., 2006,
2012). However, these mechanisms do not necessar-
ily require any representational capacity for self
and other in unison and therefore would not fulﬁll
a conservative deﬁnition of joint action, such as in
Bratman (1992). If claims for high-level explanations
are to be substantiated, future research needs to
focus on ﬁnding evidence for involvement of such
representational capacities in joint action. Individual
differences studies looking at the relationship
between different types of joint action, and ToM
measures could be one way of doing this.
The current ﬁndings leave open the possibility
that the representation construction component of
ToM plays an additional role in emergence of CR
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itself, which would explain the age of onset of CR
effects (4- to 5-year-olds, Milward et al., 2014) and
would be consistent with previous studies suggest-
ing that ToM ability might be necessary for CR
interference to occur (Humphreys & Bedford, 2011).
Thus, further research should distinguish between
three possibilities as to the emergence of CR: (a)
that the representation construction component of
ToM is a necessary condition for CR of a partner to
emerge, but that subsequent development of the
self–other distinction component helps to avoid
interfering effects on performance from representa-
tion of the other; (b) that alternative cognitive abili-
ties that develop at around 4–5 years of age can
explain the lower bound on CR in development (4-
to 5-year-olds, but not in 2- to 3-year-olds; Milward
et al., 2014); or (c) CR develops earlier than has
been found in existing paradigms, and could be
measured at a younger age with more sensitive
tasks. Such future research might open up further
opportunities for investigating the role in CR of
other developing cognitive abilities that have been
considered relevant to general joint action develop-
ment, such as self–other understanding (Brownell &
Carriger, 1990), intentionality and joint goal under-
standing (Butterﬁll, 2011; Warneken et al., 2012),
and lower level perception–action links (Di Pelle-
grino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992;
Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), all of which could be
studied using an individual differences methodol-
ogy such as has been employed here. By identifying
which of these established processes or mechanisms
are related to performance on the various joint
action paradigms that have been studied to date,
researchers can build a better picture of what
underlies these behaviors and consequently how
we should deﬁne them.
To conclude, the current results showed that
individual differences in the strength of CR effect in
4- to 5-year-olds was predicted independently by
children’s ToM ability and by their IC ability. Those
with better abilities in ToM and in IC had less inter-
ference from the joint action partner’s role in the CR
task. We argued that ToM aids children in forming
separate, stable representations of self and other,
whereas inhibition helps avoid the resulting interfer-
ence caused by representation of multiple task rules.
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